'CHOOSER DEPENDANT' PREFERENCES, AND ATTITUDES de se by Vittorioemanuele Ferrante
Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche 





































Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Università degli Studi di Firenze 






The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in the working paper series are those 
of the authors alone. They do not represent the view of Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, 





“CHOOSER DEPENDANT”  












Sen’s “chooser dependence” of preferences generates issues of indexicality which, we claim,
can in fact be reduced to a speciﬁcation of the content of preferences within a standard ap-
proach, by means of Lewis’ theory of attitudes de se. While context sensitivity of preferences
can be dealt with by the addition to the outcomes of choice of their relevant mereological
contexts, indexical sensitivity requires the content of preferences to include (the nature of)
the decision maker him/herself. The result is a naturalistic internalization of preferences,
which become object of preference, belief, and action. Keywords: Preferences, utility, choice,
attitudes, mereology, properties.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The main purpose of this paper is to cast a bridge between Amartya Sen’s celebrated the-
ory of “chooser dependant” and “menu dependant” preferences (Sen 1997), and David Lewis’
metaphysics of attitudes (Lewis 1979), including beliefs and preferences. Lewis’ theory is well-
known in the philosophical academy, but it is strangely neglected by decision theorists of diverse
upbringing.1
∗Thanks are due to Alessandro Balestrino, Antonio Gay, Ivan Moscati for useful comments. The usual dis-
claimer applies.
†Dpt. of Economic Sciences — University of Florence; manolo@uniﬁ.it
1From the philosophical community, for example, Pettit (1991, 197 fn.) decides to overlook the issues contained
in Lewis’ approach. Sen himself seems to ignore altogether “the greatest systematic metaphysician since Leibniz”
(obituary words of Mark Johnston, chairman of the philosophy department in Princeton), in his otherwise often
very rich bibliographic reference lists. Lewis’ work on attitudes is also barely mentioned in the ominous volume
on Preferences (Fehige et al. 1998) by philosophers, and hardly at all in the Handbook of Utility Theory by
economists and decision theorists (Barberà et al. 1998, 2004).
1Sen argues that the standard decision theoretic binary relation over alternative outcomes,
which interprets the preferences held by some decision maker i,s a yPi, should be further qual-
iﬁed to specify the “identity of the chooser”, as well as the “menu over which choice is being
made”, in order to deﬁne “comprehensive outcomes”, which include “acts of choice” as well as
“culmination outcomes” (Sen 1997), because preferential attitudes towards alternatives are (or,
should be) sensitive to such additional elements. Therefore, for example, binary relation Pi
i is
to be distinguished from binary relation P
j
i , the latter being the preference relation of decision
maker i over alternatives, when the choice is made by subject j, and the former, when the
chooser is i him/herself.
It can be counterargued that, however good reasons there may be for any reﬁnements, a
realistic approach to decision making should restrain any preferential attitude to vary with
respect to its content only, and that the point raised should be resolved in some speciﬁcation of
such content, rather that in an indexation of the relation, which permits variations of preferences
held by the same subject over the same contents: call this a Reduced to Content Theory of
Preference (RCTP). We feel that the points made by Sen do raise an issue of indexation, but
one which we suggest can be tackled under realistic canons, and solved while remaining within a
RCTP. The approach we suggest is by no means new, and it is in fact Lewis’ theory of attitudes
de se.2
Sen’s research programme is a well known criticism the Pareto-Samuelsonian identiﬁcation of
choice and preference (see, e.g., Sen 1993). It is more often construed as consisting of arguments
towards a breach of validity in the axiomatics of “internal consistency” of choice, such as of
well-known properties α and γ (Sen 1993, 500), rather than consisting in the conceptual issues
we wish to emphasize here. The present paper does share Sen’s implicit position against a
formalistic methodology of much axiomatics in XX century economic theory – if that is what
it is. Beyond this, we wish to suggest that committing oneself to an ontology of the objects
of preference and choice (as we mean to do, by accepting Lewis philosophy), sets the ground
for testing the validity of axiomatic restrictions, and, at the same time, eschews the question
begging traps of redeﬁning ex post the nature of the objects which happen to contradict the
formal principles: such is the case, for example, when alternatives are further qualiﬁed by the
choice set they belong to, in order to bypass a context dependence of choice over the same
alternatives.
In fact, both defending, and attacking, the validity of axioms may suﬀer from mirror formal-
2Lewis’ approach is itself not idiosyncratic: it consists in a realistic organization of lines of thought he credits
to XX Century philosophers John Perry, Hector-Neri Castañeda, Peter Geach, Arthur Prior, and, naturally, W.V.
Quine.
2istic vices: if qualifying alternatives by their context of choice, in order to rescue the validity of
axioms, begs the question, so does questioning t h ea x i o m sw h i c hr e g i m e n tt h ec h o i c eo v e rt h e
alternatives thus qualiﬁed, on the ground of their context of choice. In general, both veriﬁcation,
and falsiﬁcation of formal principles require some kind of ontological precommitment, in order
to avoid question begging faults.
2 Context, “position” and indexicality
Consider Sen’s ﬁrst example:
You arrive at a garden party, and can readily identify the most confortable chair.
You would be delighted if an imperious host were to assign you to that chair. How-
ever, if the matter is left to your own choice, you may refuse to rush to it. You select
a “less preferred” chair. (Sen 1997, 747)
And the second example:
You may prefer mangoes to apples, but refuse to pick the last mangoe from a
fruit basket, and yet be very pleased if someone else were to “force” that last mangoe
on you. (Sen 1997, 747)
Sen oﬀers two distinct routes to treat the two cases: “chooser dependance”, and “menu
dependance” of preferences. In other words, preferences (should) depend on who does the
choosing (e.g., selecting the chair), and also on the composition of the menu of alternatives
among which to choose (e.g., the pieces of fruit remaining on the tray).
Actually, both examples seem to make both points, in a similar way. On the one hand, what
counts is not only the objects of choice intrinsically, i.e., chairs and pieces of fruit, with respects
to the enjoyment they give to the chooser who makes use of them, but also, in some sense, the
consequences of any selection with respect to what objects remain available to other individuals
in a speciﬁed community. There is only one “most confortable” chair, and taking possession of
that collides with the welfare of the other guests; similarly, with the “last mangoe”. On the
other hand, there seems to be a diﬀerence between “taking”, and “being given” the object of
choice (be it the chair, or the mangoe), irrespectively of what remaining objects are left to the
other guests.
To clarify, Sen makes it quite clear that the issue at stake is not any concern of decision
maker’s with the disconfort he causes to his own fellow guests, who end up being deprived of
3something; rather, it is with his own disconfort at enjoying a privilege: the decision maker may
well be happy with the full allocation of chairs, or pieces of fruit, among all the guests,3 yet, for
some reasons, feel unconfortable with his own position in this allocation. To anticipate, these
reasons may be again two-folded: decision maker may be sorry for being the cause of the others’
discomfort (even though he might accept this same discomfort if caused by his host, say); and
he may be ashamed for having given himself the privilege.
Sen’s own suggestion here is that what counts, in the decision maker’s preferences, is not only
the “culmination outcome” of the choice (i.e., enjoying the chair, the mangoe), but also the “act
of choice” (the way a chooser obtains the outcome, and /or the “subjectivity”o ft h ec h o o s e r ) ,
and that “comprehensive” outcomes should be considered instead, including both elements.
It is our purpose to clarify the meaning of this suggestion, and, in particular, what exactly
it is that should be added to the “culmination outcome” to make it “comprehensive”.
It may be argued that the notion of the “act of choice” is ambiguous, and we wish to
disentangle two diﬀerent construals of it. These correspond to an emphasis on the real process
of obtaining (the chair, the mangoe) vs. what Sen calls the “position” of being a chooser (see
also Sen 1982).
Consider the following assertions. These should be construed as considered preferentially by
a decision maker whom we give the name of Amartya Sen (AS).
(a) AS takes the most confortable chair at the garden party
(a’) AS is given the most confortable chair at the garden party
The meaning of the two assertions is obviously diﬀerent: their natural interpretations intend
to include a similar enjoyment of the chair by AS, along with the diﬀerent real processes culmi-
nating in the same enjoyment. A diﬀerent preferential attitude towards what is denoted by the
assertions is then naturally explained by the fact that they describe diﬀerent courses of events.
The construction of realistic interpretations of the two assertions in terms of possible worlds,
a n dt h e i rp a r t s ,m a yb ea sf o l l o w s ,a n dr u ni ns i m ilar lines with what was discarded by Sen, as
discussed above, when considering the decision maker’s concern over the lesser comfort of the
other guests in enjoying the remaining chairs (or pieces of fruit) (cfr. fn. 3).
A possible concern of decision maker AS with the well-being of fellow party guests enjoying
less confortable chairs, can be interpreted by means of a spacial extension of the content of
3“A common reaction to this type of chooser dependence is to think that the “problem” arises because of a
mistaken attempt to deﬁne this person’s preference in terms of the chair on which she herself gets to sit, and not
over the full “vector” of chair allocations (involving others as well). But this is not the source of variability here.”
(Sen 1997, 747, fn.)
4preferential attitude, to include and “mereologically” add, to the part of the party consisting of
AS’s enjoying the most confortable chair, those other distinct parts including the other guests
being deprived of the best chair, and enjoying lesser ones. Similarly, a temporal extention can
be considered, to specify whether AS’s enjoyment was preceded by a process of “taking”, rather
than one of “being given”, the crucial chair.
Notice that, in both cases, what seems to be of preferential interest in such spacial and
temporal parts, is in their intrinsic nature. It is for this reason that, for example, AS’s enjoyment
of the most confortable chair, call it process x, a space-temporal part of the actual world, which
extends in four dimensions with some continuity, can be considered to remain (intrinsically)
indiscernible (or, even, identical4) whenever alternatively added to AS taking the chair, call it
process y, or to AS being given the chair, call it process y0. The result is that the mereological
sums y ⊕ x,a n dy0 ⊕ x deﬁne therefore parts of alternative worlds w and w0, but with no fault
in the identical denotation of the common sub-part x.W o r l d s w and w0 may be candidate
for mereological overlap in x, if one takes that overlapping of worlds is prohibited only if the
intrinsic nature of the common part varies with the worlds (Yablo 1998). It is for this reason
that preferential attitudes towards the same x may be reﬁned by adjoining other parts to it,
and yet retain the attitude towards y⊕x and y0⊕x to concern only the intrinsic nature of their
parts x, y,a n dy0 (rather than the relations among them).
Take now the following assertions, to be considered as above.
(b) AS takes the most confortable chair at the garden party
(b’) The 1998 Nobel prize winner in Economics takes the most con-
fortable chair at the garden party
AS’s preferential attitudes towards (b) and (b’) may diﬀer, under common sense, though not
in an obvious way: AS might favour (b’), and feel more uneasy towards (b). This assumption
will constitute part of our guiding “empirical evidence”.
First, one may wonder whether the assertions have the same meaning (beyond any natural
language ambiguity), or not, under the same theory of meaning which was implicitly used in
the examination of (a) and (a’), above: the meaning of such expressions may be the part of the
(actual) world they denote (given the indicative mode of the actions), i.e., the processes of taking
4So-called Lebnitz Second Law, which prescribes identity of indiscernibles, whenever accepted, may be re-
stricted to equality of intrinsic properties only, and exlude extrinsic properties from consideration. Otherwise,
so-called “mere Cambridge changes” may aﬀect identity: for example, if you become taller than me, I satisfy a
changed description (i.e., some of my properties have changed), but mine is only a “mere Cambridge change”
(Geach 1969).
5possession of the chair, and enjoying it, in the assumed circumstances, by subject AS. Then,
one may take the emphasized variation between (b) and (b’) to consist in synonymic linguistic
tokens which refer to the same individual. Given that AS is the (unique) 1998 Nobel prize
winner in Economics, the two linguistic expressions can only refer to the same individual, and
this reveals a friction between the assumed theory of meaning, and our “empirical evidence”,
for diﬀerent preferential attitudes towards the same object contradict RCPT. The consequence
of this – under a realistic methodology – would be to shift the ontology of the content of
preferential attitudes to ephemeral linguistic expressions, in a way which may be taken to be
unacceptable.5
On the other hand, one can distinguish between the ontological status of the reference of the
emphasized diﬀerent subject terms in the assertions. In (b), AS denotes (is the name of) an
individual;i n( b ’ ) ,the 1998 Nobel prize winner in Economics is naturally interpreted as a
description, i.e., it denotes the property of some individual: it is whoever enjoys the property of
having excelled in the eyes of the members of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences whom, one
might presume under common sense, AS wishes to favour, whether that is AS (himself) or not.
In other words, (b’) itself refers to a proposition, and it is true at all and only the possible worlds
where whoever has the property of having been awarded the Nobel prize, also has the property
of taking the most confortable chair. Instead, (b) refers to the property possessed by individual
AS in some possible world when he enjoys the most confortable chair. It is for this reason that
one may deﬁne the (preferential) attitude towards (b’) as de dicto, and the attitude towards (b)
as de re, by means of a distinction which is traditional in logic and analytical philosophy.6
This may be the reason why the meaning of the two assertions can be diﬀerent; and this
justiﬁes possibly diﬀerent preferential attitudes towards them, within a RCTP approach.
Following Lewis, we will consider properties as the argument of preferential attitudes. This
will involve considering the boolean structure of properties, to include the properties which
uniquely and exhaustively describe the alternatives, vis—à—vis a more common treatment of
5In terms of a formal language, it would imply that the objects of a preferential attitude should be the elements
of the sintax, rather than the elements of the semantic of the language. In the example, one would discriminate
preferentially between so called well formed formulas which are sintactically diﬀerent, but in fact equivalent, in
that they are interpreted by the same concrete element of the semantic.
6Preferences de dicto concerning worlds such that AS is part of them, are a way to interpret preferences held
from behind the veil of ignorance characterizing AS’s own “original position” (Harsanyi 1953, Rawls 1971): AS
may prefer the world to be such and such, independently of his own particular part he plays, or “position” he
takes, in the world. This may be one way of treating the evaluation of one’s own vs. other peoples’ lifes with
an “extended sympathy” approach, yet allowing for idiosyncratic preferences (crf. Broome 1998). But this is the
subject for another paper.
6properties as tools for an analysis of alternatives in a “multi-criterion” style, by stressing the
diﬀerence between the properties of an alternative, and the parts of an alternative; also, there will
result a theoretical gap between preference and choice, given the ontological distance between
their respective objects. Lewis’ approach includes reducing attitudes towards propositions, such
as (the reference of ) (b’), as special cases of attitudes towards properties, such as (the reference
of) (b), given that propositions are construed analytically as properties of a particular sort.
Consider now the following expressions, as asserted by decision maker AS:
(c) I take the most confortable chair at the garden party
(b) AS takes the most confortable chair at the garden party7
The self-referential (c) is a special case of an assertion de re which takes the label of de se.
In the case of epistemic attitudes, for example, it amounts to a self ascription of properties,
rather than their ascription to an individual through a name; i.e.: I know (or, believe) that I
do..., rather than: I know (or, believe) that s u c ha n ds u c ha ni n d i v i d u a ldoes....
The point here is, again, whether or not (b) and (c) are exact substitutes as contents of pref-
erence, under common sense psychology, vis-à-vis whether or not they have the same meaning,
i.e., whether I and AS denote equally. If the meaning is the same, yet common sense (therefore,
AS’s) preferential attitudes towards them diﬀer (possibly, favouring (b) over (c)), then obviously
RCTP fails. So, let us check this possibility.
The meanings of these statements are obviously the same only if they are asserted by ES,
because the denotation of the pronoun depends on the utterer. There remains the if part of the
sameness of meaning.
If AS denotes an individual, so does I: but is it always the same individual? Lewis has an
example against this, in the context of epistemic attitudes: I may watch myself in the mirror,
and ascribe properties to the individual I am watching, yet be unaware, for some reason, that
that individual is me (Lewis 1979, 156). It is because of this, that an epistemic attitude towards
myself may not be de se, but only de re: like with any other individual, the ascription of
properties to that res (who is me, but I do not know this) requires a “acquaintance” with it
7A point on notation. The bold face was used to emphasize the variation between (a) and (a’), for example;
but it comes handy now to make a diﬀerent distinction, as follows. “AS” denotes our subject, i.e., the decision
maker; “AS” denotes (part of) the object of AS’s preferences (be it an individual, or his properties). It is for this
reason that we often prefer to talk about the content, rather than the object, of preference, (which may be more
common) in order to leave room for the possibility that such content be, in fact, a subject (or his properties).
This convention will be followed only loosely as from sect. 4.
7which, in this case, is provided by the relation of watching. We will consider later what other
relations should intervene for preferential attitudes de re.
It is obviously suﬃcient to the case of preferential (as much as epistemic) diﬀerence in
attitudes, that the individual denoted by AS not be the same as the individual denoted by I.
Again, an individual is a part of a possible world. Following Lewis (1976), this part is the
individual’s entire life, including all its “time slices”. Given that Lewis’ possible worlds do not
overlap, an individual has “counterparts” in other words (where AS may not have been awarded
the Nobel prize, for example), and counterparts live more and less similar lives (Lewis 1968).
In a world w where AS and I take the most confortable chair at the garden party, the two
individuals diﬀer only if some of their (other) parts diﬀer in some world w0 (and w0 may, or
may not, be diﬀerent than w). But however this may be, certainly the individual denoted by I
cannot be diﬀerent than utterer decision maker AS, whose moral sentiments we are exploring.
The question is whether this diﬀerent identity is also necessary. If it is not, then a feeling
that common sense preferential attitudes (should) diﬀer, might imply that indexicality issues
are irreducible to content, and possibly that, in some sense, it is in fact the way that decision
maker AS “separates” AS from I himself that makes a diﬀerence. Therefore, necessity is crucial
for RCTP: on the other hand, the diﬀerent identity seems to be implied by the very suggestion
of a “separation”.
Next, we introduce what we suggest may capture Sen’s point on the “positionality” of pref-
erences. Consider preferentially (b’) versus (c); here, we suggest that AS will no doubt favour
(b’): this “common sense evidence” is oﬀered as an illustration of Sen’s point over “chooser
dependance” of preferences. Notice that this, possibly sharper, preferential attitude is in some
contrast with the greater uncertainty in the previous comparisons, i.e., between (b’) and (b) on
the one hand, and between (b) and (c) on the other: it may look as if some kind of transitivity
requirement of preferential incomparability fails to hold. We wish to suggest that this is due
to some vagueness in the reference of subject term AS in the pivot statement (b): crucially, it
might depend on whether or not individual AS’s life is taken to include the prestigious award
mentioned in (b’), vis-à-vis what other aspects AS does not share with the individual reference
of the subject term I in (c).
Be that as it may, preferences de se concern one’s own welfare (my own enjoyment of the
chair), while the content of preferences de re is other individuals’ (the other guests enjoy lesser
chairs, and AS may, or may not care for this). Naturally, my own concern over other people’s
welfare is still a moral sentiment of mine, and will, in the end, involve my own welfare indirectly:
As we will see, Lewis’s theory reduces preferences de re to preferences de se in a way which
8mirrors this last common tenet in the theory of utility.8
3 A Lewis’ style framework
David Lewis’ suggestion that the content of all attitudes should be abstract properties, sets the
treatment of preferences au par with beliefs and knowledge9. Indeed, bayesian decision theory
in all ﬁelds of application treat the content of epistemic attitudes to be sets of alternatives,
i.e., properties in Lewis’ metaphysics (Lewis 1979, 135). To the contrary, it is the Pareto-
Samuelsonian approach in economics which identiﬁes preferences and choices, and therefore
requires that the content of the former should be concrete alternatives.
As was already suggested, a theory of preferential attitudes based on properties is sometimes
erroneously considered just an analytical approach towards alternatives:10 if one follows this
line of thought, properties are construed as the parts of the content of preference. In fact, this
is not in line with a realistic, so-called extensional, approach to parthood: the parts of a pen
are its cap, ink,... and not its being expensive, broken...
A realistic theory of parthood is an extensional mereology of space-temporally extended
possible worlds (Simon 1987, Lewis 1998). The garden party, similarly, is a four-dimensional
thing, a part of a possible world, with four-dimentional parts in its turn: AS enjoying his chair,
the host showing it to him, the other guests cheering the arrival of the eminent Nobel prize
winner (or, being scornful of his arrogant pose). A possible world has parts: the entire garden
party, and its parts, are parts of a possible world, this being the actual one, i.e., from the
point of view of AS, say, as having possession of the chair.11 The parts of a possible world
in an extensional mereology can be formalized as elements of a quasi-boolean algebra (i.e., a
boolean algebra with no zero element12), with operations of sum, product, or “overlap”, and
8Lewis discusses Perry’s account of attitudes (Lewis 1979, 150—2): this diﬀers in the fact that, instead of Lewis’
self-ascription of properties to me (respectively, preference for one’s own properties), Perry considers, in a sense,
ascription of properties to ES (preference for ES’s properties) made by me. Lewis criticizes Perry’s theory on
account of semplicity; we have suggested that I and ES may not denote equally.
9That the content of preferential attitudes is the properties of the alternatives is also the tenet of Pettit (1991).
10A well-known ancestor of the analytic approaches to (no longer atomic) alternatives in the theory of economic
demand, is Lancaster theory of the “characteristics”of economic goods (1971): whether these should be construed
as properties, or otherwise parts of the alternatives is an issue we skip here.
11It is well known that Lewis denies that any world in particular may be the actual one, due to the lack of a
“God’s” point of view: any world is the actual one, from the point of view of its “inhabitants” (Lewis 1986). This
implies that any possible world has the same ontological dignity to existence as any other, which is at the basis of
Lewis’ celebrated modal “extreme realism”. Other approaches grant existence only to only one world (the actual
one), and conﬁne possibilia to non existence (Stalnaker 1976, 2001).
12As in Lewis (1998). This is not uncontroversial: Martin (1965) accepts a “null individual” as the zero element
9diﬀerence. For example, the overlap between the whole garden party, and AS’s entire life, is
AS’s enjoynment of the chair at the party; the diﬀerence between the garden party and AS
enjoying his chair, will be the latter’s local mereological context (and the source of AS’s pride,
or shame).
Let w, w0... be Lewis’ possible worlds. Let x be an extensional part of world w,s ot h a ti t
can be written that x v w,o rx @ w,i fx is a proper part of w, i.e., if x 6= w.T h ew o r l dw is
an improper part of itself, w v w.I fx and y are parts of w, then their mereological sum x ⊕ y
is also a part of w.T h es u mi sa l w a y sd e ﬁned, whether of not its terms are parts of the same
world: if x v w,a n dx0 v w0,t h e nx⊕x0 v w ⊕w0. The product x⊗y is deﬁned only if parts x
and y overlap, i.e., only if they share a common (sub)part: parts which do not overlap may be
called alternative, for nothing can be both. Summing up over all worlds deﬁne the universe W.
The diﬀerence x/y is deﬁned only if part x and y are not identical, and is a proper part of x if
x and y overlap, in an extentionally obvious way. A part of a world may be an individual at an
instant, or a temporally extended tranche de vie of an individual.
A set of parts, {x,y,...} is called a property. Sets of parts should carefully be kept distigu-
ished from the mereological summation of such parts.13 For example, {x} 6= x; here, if x is
an individual, then {x} is the property which uniquely and exhaustively speciﬁes the nature
of x (the intersection of all sets containing the element x), and it corresponds logically to the
conjunction of all the properties possessed by the individual. Properties may be within a world,
or across worlds, depending on whether their elements coexist (i.e., they are parts of the same
world), or not. Again, two properties which not not intersect may be called alternative, for
nothing can have both.
A special case of a property is a set of worlds, {w,w0,...}: call this a proposition. An event
is a property which is an object of epistemic, or “optative” attitude of some subject.
3.1 An example: to be lost in one’s own world
Let us illustrate epistemic attitudes over properties by considering an example by Perry (1977),
which is elaborated on by Lewis (1979). An “omniscient” scholar is lost in the Stanford library;
the library collects an awesome amount of books, whose content refers exhaustively to all the
propositions which are true, including all the details of the biography of the scholar, and he has
read all the books in the library. The scholar has, therefore, perfect information concerning his
of the algebra.
13In social sciences, this is standardly not the case: a committee, or a board is usually deﬁned to be the set of
its members, and formal preferences over sets are used to treat choices over such groups (see, e.g., Barberà et al.
2004b).
10actual world: in terms of propositions, his information set is a singleton, whose only element is
his own world. But he is lost: he knows that such and such a scholar is in aisle ﬁve, ﬂoor six of
the main building (he knows all true propositions), but he does not know that’s him, because
he cannot ascribe that property to himself. For all he knows, he may have the (alternative)
properties of some other individual, whom he knows to be somewhere else, in some other library:
in terms of properties, i.e., of sets of parts of worlds, his information is not perfect.
Unlike strategic game forms14, extensive game forms seem to be suitable for a comparison
of descriptive elements of game theory with a metaphysic of possible worlds. In an extensive
form, an outcome may be deﬁned as a complete chain of subsequent actions by the players, and
it may be seen to be the equivalent of a possible world, where the parts of the latter may be
equated to the actions in the chain. Take, for example, the event denoted by the statement: “I
am at a motorway exit”, made by the absent-minded driver of the one player well-known game
(Piccione-Rubinstein 1997): the driver cannot recall whether or not some particular motorway
e x i ti sb e h i n d ,o ra h e a do fh i m ,b o t hi ns p a c ea n di nt i m e .
This event is a set of two coexisting parts of the driver’s life which are subjectively indis-
cernible to the asserter: one part is his own individual t r a n c h ed ev i edenoted by the expression
“the absent-minded driver at the ﬁrst exit”, and the other is his t r a n c h ed ev i econsisting in
his being at the second exit. Notice that the (coexisting) elements of the event are strictly
alternative because they do not overlap (they are temporally non-extended, perhaps). But in
a broader sense, they would be “alternative”, albeit only from the point of view of “I”, even if
they did overlap (over some time extension, say) so long as the mental “I” is deﬁned to be a
part of their sum, but mereologically larger than their overlap. Then, one could not “place” “I”
within each of both parts. In fact, the driver is lost, not just in his own world, but also strictly
in himself.
Perry’s scholar is lost in space, as much as the absent-minded driver is lost in space-time:
due to the fact that the scholar is not (presumably) lost in time, his alternatives are not diﬀerent
tranches de vie of his own, as is the case for the absent-minded driver, in the standard version.
The scholar’s uncertainty, instead, concerns two simultaneous time slices of necessarily diﬀerent
individuals. Therefore, an issue of personal identity separates the two examples, which make,
otherwise, the same point.
In fact, game forms of imperfect information may be conceived, where indiscernibility of
nodes in one information set includes who are the players at the diﬀerent nodes (the same
14“States” in so-called Bayesian games specify strategy proﬁles and beliefs over proﬁles (and beliefs over be-
liefs...) of players. But if strategies include both factual and counterfactual actions, they cannot be parts of the
same possible world.
11constraints on capacity to act, which are the consequence of information sets, would therefore
operate on the same nodes for many diﬀerent players). Standardly, this uncertainty is modelled
instead by including uncertainty over ﬁnal pay-oﬀs in so-called games with incomplete informa-
tion, and our diﬀerent individuals turn out to be the same individual with diﬀerent pay-oﬀs:
this ex ante modelling technique may be contrasted with an empirically “internal” deﬁnition of
players who may believe it possible (and/or prefer) to be (to have the properties of) diﬀerent
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Figure 1: Two lorry drivers
Be that as it may, one can combine the issue of al-
ternatives parts of the same world with uncertainty over
the players themselves. We oﬀer the case of a two players
extensive game, with the same tree structure and infor-
mation set as the absent-minded driver game form, as de-
picted in ﬁg. 1: call this the “absent-minded lorry drivers”
game. Here, one and the same information set, in a non-
standard way, joins nodes of two diﬀerent players. The
drivers take turns at the same lorry: player 1 is at the
ﬁrst junction, player 2, at the second. An inn can accommodate both after the ﬁrst exit, but
driver 1’s home is after the second exit, while driver 2’s is at the end of the motoway. Each
driver is uncertain about himself, i.e., about his own turn (and exit), and about the location of
his own home; each driver has only two strategies, in and out, i.e., the actions available to him,









Assume it to be common knowledge that being at each junc-
tion (i.e., being himself, or the other driver), is equiprobable.
Then the normal form game is as in ﬁg. 2 (the pay-oﬀsa s -
sociated with the players’ strategy proﬁles in the cells of the
bi-matrix, are calculated as expected values of the pay-oﬀsa s -










This symmetric strategic game has a unique Nash equilib-
rium in strictly dominant stategies, namely (in1,in 2),w h o s e
ﬁnal outcome is that driver 2 goes home, and driver 1 does not.
I fo n es w a p st h ed r i v e r s ’h o m e s ,i . e . ,t h ep a y - o ﬀsa tt h et w o
bottom nodes of the extensive form in ﬁg. 1, then the strate-
gic game becomes as in ﬁg. 3; the unique Nash equilibrium
(out1,out 2) is again in strictly dominant strategies, and the drivers end up at the inn.
123.2 Intrinsicity and mereological context
Properties can be intrinsic, or extrinsic (Weatherson 2006). Intrinsic properties of a part x do
not depend on what other parts there may, or may not be in the mereological context of x;
extrinsic properties, do. Being round, being male are intrinsic, under a common view; being
single, being preferable, or prefering, are extrinsic. Extrinsic properties derive from relations
that x entertains with other parts of its mereological context. One may take that if an extrinsic
property p of x derive from some relation x entertains with part y, then property p of x ⊕ y is
intrinsic: if x is near y, then this property is part of the shape of x ⊕ y, and shape is typically
intrinsic. Therefore, x/ ∈ p, but x ⊕ y ∈ p. Conversely, if q is intrinsic of x,t h e nx ∈ p, but
possibly x ⊕ y/ ∈ p: take being round of a sphere x;i fy is a cube, then x ⊕ y is not round. The
class of properties whose all and only elements contain x will take the name of the nature of x.
The crop yield of an allotment of land does not depend, by and large, on whether or not
neighbouring allottments are also cultivated, but only on the intrisic productivity of the land;
contrariwise, the functionality of a component of an engine is not intrinsic, but it depends on its
connection with the other parts. Arrow-Debreu commodities, among other things, are speciﬁed
under extrinsic properties, like space-temporal location: the convenience of a home depends on
its proximity to a workplace.
Some extrinsic properties are due to the lack of things in the mereological context. Take a
lonely tree standing in a clearing: its extrinsic property is due to the absence of nearby trees,
even though it does require the clearing. Assume, in fact, that a possible world is made of just
the three, but with no clearing, and anything else beyond: is the tree lonely? Arguably, not.
The example may look arcane, but the formal point is not. Similarly, sum up the tree, the
clearing, and everything else in its own world, to have the entire world. Is this lonely? Again,
possibly not, even though there is nothing else in the world, for there is no “place” either, to
look into for any other content.
The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties corresponds to diﬀerent issues
raised because of the mereological context, which are of relevance for the content of preference,
in a subtle way. Take the shame I may feel in taking the best chair: this may be due to the
scornful looks I may receive while doing so, by the other guests (i.e., my mereological context):
one may take that the shame depends on the looks, and this deﬁnes a relation between one
thing and the other. Yet, feeling ashamed is an intrinsic property of mine,a n db e i n gs c o r n f u l
is an intrinsic property of the other guests: the causal relation between the two things does
not per se means extrinsicness (though, being caused by, is an extrinsic property), even if the
causal relation is necessary (there may not be any world, where I feel ashamed without receiving
13scornful looks).
For example, if, again, x is the process of enjoying the chair, and y, y0 are the processes
of taking, and being given the chair, respectively, and if the alternative possibilites are the
mereological sums x⊕y,a n dx⊕y0, then implicitely the (intrinsic) nature of x does not causally
depend on y, y0 (and we assumed above that it did, in fact), else x could not be denoted equally
(intrinsically). This does not exclude that x as part of x ⊕ y,h a sd i ﬀerent extrinsic properties
than x as part of x ⊕ y0, and it obviously has: such is the gist of the doctrine of overlapping
worlds, where the overlapping parts must be intrinsically equal to satisfy identity under the
widely accepted First Law of Leibitz.15 Lewis’ doctrine of disjoint worlds, on the other hand,
extends indiscernibility of identicals to extrinsic properties as well: x as part of x ⊕ y is not
identical to x as part of x ⊕ y0,i fy, y0 are parts of diﬀerent worlds, even though they are
intrinsically alike, and using the same denotation “x”i sam i s t a k e .
It was discussed in sec. 2 that “menu dependence” in preferences (depriving other choosers
of the best alternative, i.e., the last mangoe) can be treated under a strict RCTP by mere-
ological summation of the time extended process of ES enjoying the piece of fruit, with the
space-temporally contiguous processes of the other guests enjoying the remaining pieces of fruit
(or the remaining chairs). The intrinsic properties of such parts will take care of a real interpre-
tation of the well-being which the guests derive from such consumption. Other relevant intrinsic
considerations remain: it may make a diﬀerence to the sentiments towards ES of a third guest,
who is left with an apple, whether one, or two mangoes, were on the tray when ES made his
choice. Such a diﬀerence may not concern to the third guest’s process of consumption, but it is
intrinsic to the third guest’s overall well-being, and it is caused by a diﬀerent part of the party
(ES’s enjoyment): the intrinsic properties of both parts (ES’s, and the third guest’s enjoyments)
remain under preferential scrutiny by ES.
Conversely, ES may be concerned with the fact that the third guest enjoys a lesser piece
of fruit, this being an extrinsic property of the third guest process of consumption (in a sense,
being better or worse does not change the utility of the apple): hence, the extrinsic property
under scrutiny now is the (intrinsic) property deﬁned as the set which includes as a member the
mereological sum of ES’s with the third guest’s consumptions.
Yet, all this is not a matter of “position”, or of indexicality in preferences. Beyond the
detailed speciﬁcation of intrinsic, and extrinsic properties of the alternative courses of actions,
there remains the self-referential aspect in the wishing of such properties: it is not only a matter
of “ES taking the most confortable chair at the garden party”⊕“the other guests taking the
15As is well known, this stipulates that two identical things are indistiguishable in their properties.
14other chairs”, with all the intrinsic, and extrinsic properties of the parts of the sum, and of the
sum itself (given that the properties of the parts may, or may not, carry over to the sum, and
viceversa), it is also the circumstance that I (and I)a mp a r to fa l lt h i s .
4 Preferring oneself, and others
The metaphysics of possible worlds is an essentially descriptive doctrine which aims at a com-
prehensive generality. In contrast with the descriptive aspects of some simple decision theory,
whatever corresponds in the metaphysics to the decision maker, player, agent, ect., of the de-
cision theory, that will be a part of whatever includes the objects of decision, namely possible
worlds.
That the subject should be part of the object is not entirely new to decision theory in general,
and especially in game theory: the introduction of notions and techiques of epistemic logic in
the 80’s and 90’s gave analytical status to the standard informal game theoretical requirements
of self-reference of interactive decision making, whereby, for example, beliefs over other players’
(and one’s own) beliefs are strategically crucial.16 In addition to this, a thorough metaphysical
approach may introduce two novelties: self-referencial preferences, and a mereological analysis
of their content.
The ﬁrst novelty may not be of game theoretical concern: preferences over preferences are
not of strategic interest as much as beliefs over beliefs are. More likely, it is of concern in a
theory of preferences. The fact that I prefer mangoes to apples is a property of mine, and not
of any piece of fruit (unlike “utility”, perhaps); if the object of preferences were fruit, then that
property of mine would not be of any interest. But Sen’s concern is, as we suggested, over the
fact that I take the mangoe, and that is something which confers properties to me. Thus, if
the content of my preferences are to be the properties I have, then also are my own preferences,
which are properties of mine.
On the other hand, granting that the subjects are part of the content of preferences imply
that others’ preferences can also be under scrutiny, as is the case when one prefers that others
do not prefer reading Lady Chatterley’s lover,t ot a k ea no b v i o u se x a m p l e( w h e t h e ro n ep r e f e r s
that others do read Lady Chatterley’s lover,o rn o t ) .
Suitably axiomatized metapreferences are often interpreted as comparisons of the “diﬀer-
ences” between “utility levels” which are established by the “ﬁrst order” preferences: in other
words, if p is preferred to q,a n dp0 is preferred to q0,a n dt h eﬁrst preference is (second level)
16Recent surveys on so-called “epistemic” game theory are in four distinct entries of the New Palgrave Dictionary
of Economics ( 2 0 0 8 ) ,b yA .B r a n d e n b u r g e r ,A .H e i f e t z ,a n dM .S i n i s c a l c h i .
15preferred to the second preference, then this is often taken to mean that the “gain in utility”
w h i c hi so b t a i n e db yl e a v i n gq for p,i sg r e a t e rt h a nt h eg a i ni nu t i l i t yw h i c hi so b t a i n e db yl e a v -
ing q0 for p0 (see, for example, Fishburn 1970). A diﬀerent approach to metapreferences regard
these as moral values: if I prefer preferring p to q,t h a np r e f e r r i n gp0 to q0, that may mean that
I regard the ﬁrst preference as morally superior (Moore 1903, Lewis 1989). The distinction is
obviously independent of the validity of the axiomatization on metapreferences which may allow
for a numerical representation of ﬁrst order preferences of a “cardinal” kind (i.e., unique up to
unit of measure, and origin). On the other hand, the distinction vanishes whenever morality
is identiﬁed with personal well-being. At the other extreme, morality may be seen to require
“disinterested” comparisons, such as those made over propositions, i.e., independently of the
subject’s own position in the world.
The second novelty is mereology. Again, consider epistemic game theory. In a so-called
Bayesian game, a player i’s qualitative beliefs “at a state of the world s” are usually deﬁned by
an “accessibility” (or Kripke) relation between s and the elements of a set of states P. Then,
i’s beliefs comprehend proposition P (if we equate states and possible worlds), and all supersets
of P, by monotonicity; therefore, s itself is an element of a set KiP, whose elements are all the
states at which player i believes P.T h es e tKiP is also a proposition, and it is i’s belief in P.
But if player i is just a part of the “state”, i.e., a part of his possible world, then the domain of
i’s accessibility relation is no longer on the possible worlds, but on parts of worlds. Therefore,
i’s belief itself is no longer a proposition, but a property, i.e., a set of parts of possible worlds.
Now, the question is: which parts? Parts of i,e v i d e n t l y ,i . e . ,t h o s ea tw h i c hi believes P,i fa n d
when he does so.
Again, Lewis’ theory sets all attitudes au par. Therefore, whatever questions are put over
beliefs, count for preferences as well. The mangoe is part of the “state” (world) at which I prefer
mangoes; now, does the mangoe “prefer” my eating apples? No, because not every part of a
world has such properties as attitudes, but only those parts which possess attitudinal mental
images, and whom we identify as subjects.
More in general, once preferences are properties of parts of possible worlds, they become
object of belief and of action, rather than just their premisses. Given than a particular pref-
erence structure may not be essential to a subject of decision, the latter may be deﬁn e do na n
independent empirical basis, and be allowed to ha v e“ s t a t ed e p e n d e n t ”p r e f e r e n c es t r u c t u r e s .
Rational decision making may be founded on a criterion of consistency of actions with beliefs
and preferences, rather than on a criterion of adequacy of the former to the latter.
164.1 De re reduces to de se;b u tde se is a special de re.
G i v e nt h a ti ti smy preferences that are under scrutiny, and not other subjects’, preferences over
properties which others have, matter because they concern me, and not them: this is the issue
of preferences de re. We consider this issue by paraphrasing Lewis’s point on belief de re,a n d
emphasize (with sans serifs) what we alter in the original quotation in order to ﬁto u rc a s e 17
(also, we consider an attitude of desire, rather than one of preference, to mantain the one-arity):
“To wish property taking the best chair to individual some party guest [...] – to
desire de re that the guest has the best chair –i st owish enjoying the best chair to
the guest under some suitable description of the guest. It remains to ask what makes
a description ‘suitable’.” (Lewis 1979, 153)
Granted that the content of a description is a property, and that some properties are relations,
here are some suggestions for “suitable descriptions”: the 1998 Nobel prize winner in economics;
the guest who is looking at me scornfully; the guest who is identical to myself. Lewis’ suggestions
for the case of epistemic attitudes are in fact that the suitable description should either “capture
the essence of the guest, or [be] a relation of acquaintance that I bear to the guest” (155), such
as being identical to oneself (157), and such that of looking (156), respectively.
A property is essential to an individual, if the individual possesses the property in every
world where it exists; in other words, loosing an essential property changes the individuality.
Possibly, being the 1998 Nobel prize winner in economics is essential to no individual in the
party: how is it, then, that I approve to (some guest contingently being) the 1998 Nobel prize
winner in economics enjoy the chair? Probably, because of my witnessing that, if my preference
is de re, even though, because of the ambiguity of a natural language, one cannot distinguish
e a s i l yb e t w e e nt h i s ,a n dt h ede dicto assertion (b’) in sect. 2:18 the ambiguity stems from the
possibility that the contingent description (“the 1998 Nobel prize winner in economics”) can be
used as a name of an individual, rather than as a property, as was taken to be in the examination
of (b’) above.
In other words, if being the unique 1998 Nobel prize winner in economics were (uniquely19)
essential to AS, say, any guest in the party should no longer need to wittness AS enjoy the
17L e w i s1 9 7 6g e n e r a lt r e a t m e n to fa t t i t u d e si si nf act almost exclusively elaborated and exempliﬁed for belief
and knowledge. It is therefore necessary to ﬁll some gaps to treat optative attitudes as well, along similar lines.
18It is possibly because of this ambiguity that, in a postscript, Lewis admits of the possibility that his account
can be mistakenly seen as a reduction of attitudes de re to attitudes de dicto (Lewis 1979, 156).
19That is, if no other person can be the Nobel prize winner, whether essentially, or not. Otherwise, the property
is not one-to-one with the essence of AS.
17best chair, in order to approve of that. This imply a restriction on preferences: if being the
unique 1998 Nobel prize winner in economics is essential to AS, the guest should mantain the
same optative attitudes towards the set of possible worlds were the 1998 Nobel prize winner
in economics takes the best chair (i.e., the proposition to the extent of which the 1998 Nobel
prize winner in economics takes the best chair), and the set of parts of those worlds (a property,
strictu sensu) which consist in AS enjoying the best chair (which is equal to the set of parts of
all worlds consisting of whoever is the 1998 Nobel prize winner in economics enjoying the best
chair, because, in the assumption, there is no world where AS is not the 1998 Nobel prize winner
in economics, and viceversa). In other words, preferences de dicto, and preferences de re can be
identiﬁed for attitudes, in the case of identiﬁcation under essential descriptions.
In fact, Lewis’ relations of acquaintance seem best suited for epistemic attitudes only: it is
only because I am looking at a stranger that I come to believe that he is taller than me. As for
preferential (and other optative) attitudes, a relation of use,o ro ft r a n s i t i v eliving, may appear
to be more appropriate: it is because I live my host showing me to the best chair that I prefer
he has that property (rather than, say, the property of being shocked by my rudeness).
Now, beliefs de se are a special case of beliefs de re with no need for a relation of acquaintance,
given that the relation of identity to oneself is necessary (157), hence essential20:Ib e l i e v et h a t
I am the 1998 Nobel prize winner in Economics (if I do believe it), simply because it cannot be
that I is not (therefore, it is essential to me that I is) me. The same will be for preferences de
se: it is not that I make use of, or live, myself,i ti st h a tI is me.
On the other hand, beliefs (and preferences) de re depend inevitably, for Lewis, on attitudes
de se, and on their irreducibly psicological self-referential nature. Ascribing property: “being the
1998 Nobel prize winner in Economics” to some party guest, requires self-ascribing the property
of being acquainted with the party guest; similarly, wishing the property: “enjoying the best
chair” to some party guest, requires self-wishing the property of wittnessing the party guest on
the best chair.
4.2 Individuals and worlds
AS is part of a world w; but some of his properties are not essential to him. Therefore, there are
worlds w0 where AS exists (i.e., he is part of w0), and where he possesses diﬀerent properties.
According to Lewis, AS in w is but a counterpart of AS in w0,c a l li tA S 0.B et h a ta si tm a y ,
it is obviously useful to mantain personality through diﬀerent worlds: let {w}AS be the set of
20If a property is necessary, then all individuals have it always; therefore, AS has it in all worlds; therefore, AS
has it in all the worlds where he exists, i.e., it is essential to him.
18worlds our subject is part of. The set AS = {AS | AS v w | w ∈ {w}AS},w h i c hc a nb ed e ﬁned
on the ground of an ontological precommitment with respect to {w}AS, is the intersection of all
properties which are essential to AS. This sets a dividing lines with respect to worlds w/ ∈ {w}AS,
and with respect to properties p/ ∈ AS.
If P is a proposition whose elements are only worlds which AS is not part of (if w ∈ P,t h e n
w/ ∈ {w}AS), then AS’s preferential attitude towards P is perfectly “disinterested”, both in the
sense that it does not aﬀect him, and in the sense that he (and anyone else, be it part of the
world, or not) can do nothing about it (if AS has no part in w, then obviously he does not act
in w either, and whatever others may do, has no consequence for AS). Whatever attitude AS
may have towards P,i ti sn o tb e c a u s eA Sm a y“ l i v e ”P: one might maintain that AS has no
reason for holding attitudes towards P at all.
On the other hand, AS will be “impartial” towards the worlds he does live in, if his attitudes
are independent of the part he plays, or position he holds, in such worlds: such is the case
when AS favours that the 1998 Nobel prize winner takes the best chair at the garden party,
independently of who in the party he his. Thus, AS will be impartial towards propositions Q
whose elements are all in {w}AS. As a special case, AS is impartial with respect to propositions
Q when this is the intersection of all his essential properties, i.e., when Q = {w}AS. Again, if p
is essential, p ⊇ AS,t h e nA Si s( w e a k l y )i n t e r e s t e d ,f o ri tm a yw e l la ﬀect AS’ well-being, but
he (and anyone else) cannot do anything about it.
It is only when a property is not essential to an individual that he may wish to have, or
n o tt oh a v ei t .I fp is a property which is (strictly) smaller than AS (i.e., p ( AS), then AS is
(strictly) “interested” in p,f o rh ec a nh a v ep as much as he can not have it
On the other hand, it is only when a property is not essential to an individual that it may
include parts of the same world, so that the relative attitude cannot be de dicto,a n dm u s tb ede
se. Conversely, a property which is not essential may have elements which are all not coexisting
(each element is a part of a diﬀerent world)
Clearly, interest and partiality do not classify all preferences exhaustively, for some, more or
less “gerrymandered” propositions include both worlds in {w}AS and not in {w}AS,a n ds o m e
general properties include both worlds and parts of worlds strictly. Also, a natural extension to
the notion of personality makes it a less than a crisp criterion: the person I am at (or before)
birth may be the same as that after seventy years’ time, more or less: rather, it may be only
similar.
195 Further issues, and conclusions
The scope of this paper was on fundamental issues concerning optative attitudes. It is too
obvious that the approach leaves many open questions.
O p t a t i v ea t t i t u d e su s e di ne c o n o m i c sa n di nd e c i s i o nt h e o r i e su s u a l l yc o m ei nt h ef o r mo f
binary relations over alternatives. One may, ﬁrst of all, notice that the objects in a binary
preference need not be alternative: I may prefer my morning coﬀee to my evening beer; yet, I
can have both. This is how it should be, since the subject will normally possess more than one
property (i.e., will belong to more than one set of parts of the worlds), and it would be probably
an unduly restriction not to allow for preferences between these.
Secondly, a naive question concerns the arity of such optative attitude, vis-à-vis diﬀerent
interpretations of the diﬀerence between the standard notion of preference and the notion of
utility in economics and decision theory. It is well known that the binarity of the attitude is well
suited for receiving restrictions which guarantee various kinds of ordinal and cardinal numerical
representability (see, e.g., Fishburn 1970): does this mimic a quantitative interpretations of
a unary optative attitude, or of an intrinsic property of the possible alternatives, such as is,
possibly, implicit in a XIX Century notion of utility? Alternatively, the binarity may also
interprets change: it is because subject i wishes to cease (having property) p,f o r( h a v i n g
property) q (wherein p and q are now necessarily alternative), that one says that i prefers q to
p.
These, and other issues remain beyond the scope of the paper. What was suggested here,
is essentially a conceptual framework which may be a basis for analytical treatment. The main
feature of the suggestion is that “it invokes only such entities and distinctions as we need to
believe in anyway” (Lewis 1989, 68): it is on the basis of this independent ground that formal
principles may be tested.
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